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ANDREW JENSEN KERR* 
ABSTRACT 
The novel problem of art threats, typified by threatening rap lyrics, 
has destabilized our First Amendment regime. We have traditionally 
relied on industry gatekeepers like music labels or museum curators to 
determine what counts as art.  However, with the advent of the Internet, 
amateur artists can share their aesthetic output with a public audience, 
bypassing the threshold quality control work of the Art World. This has 
forced courts to acknowledge foundational questions about what kind 
of art is covered by the First Amendment.  In brief, it covers “good” art. 
In this paper I offer a synthetic conception of the First Amendment 
that contextualizes this aesthetic gatekeeper problem within a freedom of 
speech doctrine that has been forced to distinguish art from threat. I echo 
the claims of law and rap scholars that the amateur attempt at rap should 
be interpreted within a permissive standard for political speech, but I 
remind this scholarly network that our category of art speech still 
connotes a threshold level of quality. Young artists need help with self-
editing; they do not need to be punished. But this does not mean the 
amateur attempt at art should be reified as good art within our 
constitutional law doctrine. I thus consider some pragmatic solutions for 
how either civil society or the state can mirror the essential quality 
control work done by prior Art World actors. My thinking is informed 
by a noble understanding of rap as well as the cultural assumptions that 




Copyright © 2021 Andrew Jensen Kerr. 
 *   Lecturer of Legal English, Georgetown Law.  I thank Robin West, Madhavi Sunder, 
Greg Klass, Lexi Freeman, Sonya Bonneau, Lucius Outlaw III, Almas Khan, Rafi Reznik, 
Jomana Qaddour, and Bradley Girard for their constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this 
Article.  I also thank Hayley Lawrence and Chris Ricigliano for their diligent editorial work. 
KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  6:50 PM 
174 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 16 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  HOW WE FRAME ART ......................................................................... 174 
II. WHAT ART IS AND WHAT ART DOES ................................................ 181 
III. THE ART WORLD AS GATEKEEPER .............................................. 183 
IV. WHAT COUNTS AS A RAP? ............................................................... 187 
A.  Elonis v. United States: Do Elonis’s posts count as “raps”? .. 188 
V. ART AS COVER? OR COVERING ART? ............................................. 190 
VI. RAP IN POLITICAL AND AESTHETIC CONTEXT ............................. 194 
VII.  ONE CASE, TWO WAYS ................................................................. 197 
A. Was Jamal Knox doing political speech? ................................... 197 
B.  Was Jamal Knox doing aesthetic speech? .................................. 198 
VIII.  WHY WE COVER ART ................................................................... 201 
A.  A Marketplace of Art Speech ..................................................... 201 
B.  Art Speech as Political Speech .................................................... 202 
C.  Art speech as autonomy .............................................................. 203 
D.  Art speech as culturally important speech ................................. 204 
IX. PROPOSALS ....................................................................................... 206 
A.  A rap guild ................................................................................... 206 
B.  The State as Quality Control Worker? ....................................... 208 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 211 
 
I.  HOW WE FRAME ART 
Rapper Yasiin Bey (better known as “Mos Def”) recently debuted 
an immersive exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum for his newest album, 
Negus.1  It was a novel approach, especially compared to the industry 
trend of “bundling” music with apparel or other merchandise to 
improve album sales or streaming numbers.2  Whereas many recording 
artists are experimenting with marketing strategies to popularize their 
music, Bey chose to intentionally limit initial access to his newest 
release. He relied instead on exclusivity, critical reputation and 
aesthetic experience to distinguish his album from the infinite amount 
of new music available on the internet.  Bey’s strategy is also an explicit  
 
 
 1.  yasiin bey: Negus, BROOKLYN MUSEUM (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.brooklynmuseum. 
org/exhibitions/yasiin_bey_negus. 
 2.  Anne Steele, Want an Album With That T-Shirt? Billboard Tightens Rules on Bundling 
Music and Merchandise, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-an-
album-with-that-t-shirt-billboard-tightens-rules-on-bundling-music-and-merchandise-
11574776800. 
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nod to the notion that rap is art, and that like conventional visual 
installations, his music is best appreciated in a museum context. 
It is no longer avant-garde to observe how the institutional 
processes of the Art World (i.e., record labels, critics, and fans) frame 
our understanding of whether something is received as “art” rather 
than mere craft or kitsch. For example, Bey’s experimental brand of rap 
music registers as aesthetic in part because of the initial decision of 
museum curators to present it and record labels to distribute it.  The 
community of rap critics verified Bey’s status as a rapper, so audiences 
are primed to hear his innovative musical gestures as raps. 
There is a qualitative boundary separating Bey’s work from the 
amateur attempt at rap because other gatekeepers acknowledged its 
value first. For most of the twentieth century, courts were able to 
delegate the question of “What is art?” to market players.3 Once 
someone purchased a sculpture, visual painting, a ticket to a play, or a 
musical recording, a judge could cite to these economic decisions as 
evidence of the artfulness of a given work.  This allowed courts to avoid 
the difficult problem of aesthetic relativism first identified by Justice 
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.4 and later echoed 
by Justice Scalia in Pope v. Illinois.5 Judges deferred to institutional 
gatekeepers and the context of an artwork to determine whether an 
unconventional piece had aesthetic value and thus protection under the 
First Amendment.6 
So, it did not matter that parents thought their six-year-old child was 
capable of producing a Jackson Pollock look-alike.7 The Art World 
loved Pollock, and this institutional pedigree made his artwork 
 
 3.  See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 836–39 (noting that 
Courts have resigned themselves to reaching “bald” conclusions about an object’s art status 
without including adequate analysis to support their statements). See also, e.g., Parks v. LaFace 
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (confirming it is not the role of judges to make 
individualized aesthetic determinations); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 
4th 387, 409 (Cal. 2001) (confirming that courts are not to value one form of depiction over 
another); Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that 
originality in copyright law is a legal standard). 
 4.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
 5.  Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504–05 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 6.  Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253–54 
(1995) (finding that the institutional context of an art exhibition like Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymade sculpture, Fountain, reinforced its First Amendment protections). 
 7.  See Ellen Winner, Could Your Child Really Paint That?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 19, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/could-your-child-really-paint-that-1539959482 (referring to 
recent academic studies that show even the untrained eye can detect quality differences in abstract 
artwork). 
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something separate and unique from the haphazard paint splatters of a 
kindergartener. Indeed, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston, Justice Souter remarked that the First 
Amendment “unquestionably shielded . . . [the] painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, [and] Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”8 But because free speech doctrine is commonly 
understood to protect the transmission of ideas, judges and scholars 
have struggled to articulate a principle for why First Amendment 
doctrine protects aesthetic items like abstract art,9 nonsensical poetry, 
or atmospheric lyrics in rap songs.10 
It is difficult to identify a factual hypothetical for when the legality 
of a Jackson Pollock painting might be legitimately challenged.  His 
160-square-foot canvas “Mural” (1943) could be distracting as a public 
art installation for passing motorists, but to my knowledge there are no 
Pollocks visible from roadways.11 Like much of modern or 
contemporary art, the fact that Pollock’s art does not convey a 
“particularized message” places it outside the purview of the criminal 
law.  Rather, we can read Justice Souter’s line in Hurley as reflecting 
the facile logic of “Why not?” We assume there to be little damage done 
to First Amendment doctrine by name-checking Pollock’s work, and it 
helps to reassure Americans of the prestige value of the First 
Amendment. We all agree the First Amendment is special, and so it 
should of course protect unique forms of expression like the paintings 
of Jackson Pollock and the poetry of Lewis Carroll that are part of our 
cultural canon.12 What is there to lose? 
 
 8.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
Justice Souter’s passing reference suggests that this is a shared presumption of the legal 
community and does not require logical explication. However, prior to opinion in Hurley it was 
unclear if art had First Amendment Status. See also Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and 
Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 
222 (“[M]ost commentators consider artistic expression as subservient to, and derivative of, 
political expression; they determine the first amendment value of artistic expression primarily, if 
not solely, by its resemblance to political expression.”). 
 9.  Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 111 (1996) (The Supreme Court 
“should consciously elevate art to the top of the First Amendment’s pyramid of protection, 
alongside political speech,” suggesting that at the time of writing it was not part of the normative 
hierarchy). 
 10.  See, e.g., Amy Adler, A Decision for the Ages: A Symposium Marking the Centenary 
of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 687, 711 (2018) (“The difficulty of reducing 
art works to ‘ideas’ or ‘messages’ has been a recurrent problem in free speech law and theory.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, “Art and the First Amendment” in FREE SPEECH BEYOND 
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 72 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds.) 
(2017). 
 12.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
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Outside of outlier cases like Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts 
Center,13 where Robert Mapplethorpe’s photography was contested as 
obscene, it has been challenging for scholars to identity possible 
examples of criminal artwork.14  As recently as 2008 Professor Edward 
J. Eberle wrote, “it is hard to imagine art speech constituting 
incitement, threats or fighting words. Instances of art speech almost 
never involve violence or threatened violence germane to these 
categories of unprotected speech.”15  The concept of an “art threat” was 
incongruent with a free speech doctrine that does not recognize threats 
as speech and was difficult to even conceptualize for an Art World 
where aesthetic expression is assumed to be polysemic and received by 
a general audience. 
The advent of internet rap and performance art has disrupted this 
First Amendment regime.  These novel media are distinguished from 
traditional art forms in their unmediated presentation, which facilitates 
them being viewed as threatening to certain audiences.  When Marina 
Abramovic stares at us in the MoMA we sense her aesthetic aura and 
recognize it as a curated experience.16  It is not simply “staring” in the 
mundane sense; rather the preternatural ability of Abramovic 
transforms this otherwise quotidian event into an artful experience.  It 
does not feel threatening.  Still, it is an experience that challenges the 
epistemological limits of human language: how to articulate in words 
what makes Abramovic’s elevated form of staring different from our 
own?What if I recorded a video of me staring into my iPhone camera 
lens and uploaded it to YouTube and captioned it as “art”?  Would my 
saying, “It’s art” make it so? Or what if I uploaded a selfie video in 
which I blithely repeat the line “I will kill the person I don’t like,” and 
refer to it as a “rap” in the thumbnail?  Has it become a rap?  There 
might not be an articulable way to distinguish my seemingly literal 
threat from a similar lyric by an established rapper.  We can cite to the 
musicality and flow of the actual rapper, and we can contextualize the 
 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787–1800 (2004) (considering 
“the magnetism of the First Amendment”). 
 13.  566 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1990). 
 14.  See Alex Palmer, When Art Fought the Law and the Art Won, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 
2, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-art-fought-law-and-art-won-1809 
56810/. 
 15.  Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1 (2008). 
 16.  See, e.g., Michael Zhang, Sitting, Staring, and Crying with Marina Abramovi  at MoMa, 
PETAPIXEL (Apr. 23, 2010), https://petapixel.com/2010/04/23/sitting-staring-and-crying-with-
marina-abramovic-at-moma/ (explaining that visitors sit and stare back at Abramovic for long 
periods of time, and many are in fact moved to tears). 
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line as a layer in the song’s sonic texture. Still, these are distinctions 
separate from the surface language of the line in itself: “I will kill the 
person I don’t like.” 
The First Amendment treats a professional rap differently than my 
amateur attempt. But this incongruous treatment is problematic 
because it requires an implicit qualitative judgment of when a rap is 
artful. This paper builds on the work of Jed Rubenfeld17 and Genevieve 
Lakier,18 who have deconstructed the conceptual integrity of high-
value and low-value speech in First Amendment doctrine.19  Because 
certain categories of speech are seen as low-value (such as inciting or 
threatening speech), it is easier to make content-based judgments 
about the kinds of speech that can be lawfully regulated. We might not 
often think about true threats doctrine explicitly in these terms, but a 
statute that criminalizes threatening speech is equivalent to a form of 
content-based discrimination in which the government favors non-
threatening speech over threatening speech. 
These content-based restrictions are informed by broader cultural 
intuitions of what the First Amendment is meant to cover. In realist 
terms, it covers what we, as a legal culture, think it should. This explains 
why the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect not just core 
speech rights like political speech, but also the art speech of Jackson 
Pollock and Lewis Carroll.  For example, in Kleinman v. City of San 
Marcos, the Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment covers only 
great art.20  The First Amendment makes quality distinctions.  Courts 
used to be able to rely on institutional gatekeepers to discern them. 
By definition, user-generated internet content bypasses the quality 
control work of Art World gatekeepers.21  Here, I focus on the precise 
 
 17.  Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 823 (2001) (“The 
freedom of speech, as we actually know it and have it in this country, is irreconcilable with high-
value/low-value thinking.”). 
 18.  Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2168 
(2015) (introducing a theory that First Amendment protections only minimally extend to low-
value speech). 
 19.  By “modern First Amendment doctrine,” I refer to the First Amendment as interpreted 
after Justice Holmes’ iconic dissent in Abrams v. United States, which urged restraint in 
suppressing free speech unless that speech presents an imminent danger. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). 
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 
1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the prevailing view among academics—that Schauer himself 
does not support—is that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when the Abrams opinion was 
written). 
 20.  Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 21.  Prior scholarship has identified the gatekeeper problem in the context of fake news or 
defamatory or hostile speech. See, e.g., Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: 
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issue of who makes threshold decisions about whether something is art 
at all.  When does the amateur attempt at making a work of art—like a 
rap song—become “art speech” for constitutional purposes? This has 
direct implications for First Amendment blackletter doctrine which 
assumes that if something qualifies as “art,” it cannot simultaneously 
be a true threat. 
My central claim is that the Art World’s threshold decision to 
present an artwork or publish a music album effectively insulates the 
work from a true threats analysis because courts have deferred to the 
aesthetic judgment of these institutional gatekeepers. Courts did not 
need to cite to these “authorities” in their opinions because the 
assumption that professional art could not be threatening was so 
pervasive. But with the advent of the internet, courts must now grapple 
with the reality of true threats in rap form. 
In the last five years, the Supreme Court has been asked three times 
to resolve the question of rap threats but has avoided directly 
confronting the issue each time.  In Elonis v. United States, defendant 
Anthony Elonis posted to Facebook violent rap lyrics that seemed to 
threaten his wife and a federal investigator. Chief Justice Roberts 
retreated from the question of whether the aesthetic quality of the rap 
lyrics might be relevant to a threats analysis, and instead decided the 
case based on the defendant’s subjective intent.22 In Bell v. Itawamba 
County School Board, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for a case 
in which a high school student was suspended for a violent rap about 
his two gym teachers who were accused of lewd behavior.23  And in 
2019, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Knox v. Pennsylvania, in 
which an amateur rapper argued that his violent lyrics should have 
been interpreted non-literally, even though he referred by name to the 
law enforcement officers who had arrested him.24 
 
 
Public Figures and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 76 (2019) (“In the 
new speech ecosystem brought about in part by platforms like Facebook, people can be thrust 
into the public sphere and bypass the gatekeeping function of the traditional press.”); Erin 
Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 69, 71 (2017) (“As the role of information gatekeeper starts to pass from journalists at legacy 
news organizations to engineers, coders, and designers, the very nature of the Fourth Estate and 
the news it produces is changing.”). 
 22.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2022 (2015). 
 23.  Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 
(2016). 
 24.  Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert denied sub nom. Knox v. 
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
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Knox v. Pennsylvania inspired this paper on the relationship 
between aesthetic quality and First Amendment coverage.  The core 
question for courts in cases like Knox is “When should seemingly literal 
speech acts be interpreted non-literally?” Prior to the internet, we 
implicitly assumed that certain kinds of non-literal speech or expressive 
acts were “art” and thus endowed with constitutional protection. This 
paper explains how we have traditionally deferred to the judgment of 
institutional gatekeepers to make these threshold decisions of what 
counts as art in the First Amendment context. But because the internet 
has progressively eroded the role of these gatekeepers, this question is 
all the more urgent for courts to answer.  A well-intentioned (but 
confused) law and rap academic community (a mix of legal scholars, 
sociologists, criminologists and pedigree rappers) argues for blanket 
First Amendment coverage of rap lyrics and their insulation from use 
as courtroom evidence.25 However, this is not how the First 
Amendment is meant to work.26 I expand on the coverage-protection 
distinction to explain how the First Amendment art speech doctrine 
should apply to rap music, and argue for coverage of rap lyrics based 
on the quality of the rap or rapper, or on membership in a sort of rap 
guild.  Unfortunately, rap is a shape-shifting genre that defies easy 
categorization, and one that depends on fickle notions of reputation 
and public perception. Rap has also been traditionally characterized as 
a transgressive art form, so conditioning First Amendment coverage on 
group membership might be inconsistent with the very ethos of this 
musical form. 
In this Article, I analyze how internet rap raises foundational 
problems in how the First Amendment regime distinguishes speech 
acts.  I review recent cases concerning rap lyrics, like the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States, to suggest how we should 
think about separate categories of art speech and political speech. This 
raises difficult questions about First Amendment coverage: How do we 
 
 25.  See, e.g., Erik Nielson, ‘Rap on Trial’: Why Lyrics Should Be Off-Limits, ROLLING 
STONE (May 3, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/rap-on-trial-why-lyrics-
should-be-off-limits-116368/ (describing the use of rap lyrics as evidence). 
 26.  See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161 (“More generally, if this Court were to rule that Appellant’s 
decision to use a stage persona and couch his threatening speech as ‘gangsta rap’ categorically 
prevented the song from being construed as an expression of a genuine intent to inflict harm, we 
would in effect be interpreting the Constitution to provide blanket protection for threats, however 
severe, so long as they are expressed within that musical style. We are not aware of any First 
Amendment doctrine that insulates an entire genre of communication from a legislative 
determination that certain types of harms should be regulated in the interest of public safety, 
health, and welfare.”). 
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define the boundaries of “art speech” when perceptions of artfulness—
especially in the context of abstract or otherwise meaning-resistant art 
works—had previously been based on the critical reception of our 
institutional gatekeepers? I consider how either civil society or the 
state can mirror the essential quality control work done by prior Art 
World actors so that we can maintain the integrity of the First 
Amendment regime while providing a space for amateur artists to 
experiment with provocative ways of expressing themselves. 
II.  WHAT ART IS AND WHAT ART DOES 
Rap is evaluated by audiences comparably to other gestalt art forms 
like pop art,27 given its referential nature. The pop art movement 
inspired Arthur Danto to unpack how material objects are transformed 
into “art,” based on the work’s institutional context, and by how the 
Art World presents and values it.28 For example, Warhol’s iconic 
Campbell’s Soup Cans depicts a seemingly mundane subject. But the 
iterated presentation of the Warhol imagery inspires a deeper sort of 
mentation among viewers that allows for playful critique of notions of 
art and advertisement. The Art World viewed it as transformative.29  
Still, it might be impossible for the viewer to articulate what, if 
anything, distinguishes the surface quality of the Warhol painting from 
that of the original consumer product. 
Rap shares this same core dilemma. I make the descriptive claim in 
this paper that we evaluate the quality of a rap track based on its sonic 
impact. Although lyrics help to shape the texture of a song and contour 
the listener experience, it is wrong to equate song lyrics with written 
poetry.30 Rap lyrics do not serve the same function as written poetry, 
and rap—like any form of music—is not foremost a literary art. 
Nevertheless, judges typically read rap lyrics in isolation when they 
engage in a true threats analysis. This is problematic because no 
interpreter, whether a court or a music critic, can answer the threshold 
 
 27.  See pop art, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pop%20art (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (defining pop art as “art in which 
commonplace objects (such as road signs, hamburgers, comic strips, or soup cans) are used as 
subject matter and are often physically incorporated in the work”). 
 28.  Arthur Danto, The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense, 37 HIST. & THEORY 127, 128 
(1998). 
 29.  Id. at 141 (observing the paradigm-shifting impact of Warhol’s art). 
 30.  See, e.g., @sad13, TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:42 PM), 
https://twitter.com/sad13/status/1159248479694147584 (referring to David Berman from Silver 
Jews when she tweeted “songwriting is NOT poetry, it’s crazy one person was so good at both”). 
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art speech question of whether a rap is good by thinking about lyrical 
meaning divorced from a rap track’s sonic experience. Indeed, the 
brilliant rap and the genuinely awful attempt at rap might each be read 
as wooden and mundane on their own, making it impossible for a judge 
to discern what, if anything, makes rap “art.”31 The transcribed lyric 
sheet of both the brilliant rap and the awful attempt at rap may “look” 
the same to a reader, to the extent that neither reads as literary or artful. 
We only know if a rap is good, or even a rap at all, by listening to it. 
Rap lyrics, like most song lyrics, are better understood as 
vocalizations that comprise only part of a broader experience—that is, 
the song. And so, like most song lyrics, these vocalizations might be 
nonsensical or improvised and may not necessarily be intended to 
convey meaning. For this reason, the majority of rap lyrics should be 
interpreted as non-literal. The industry’s transition to “ambient” and 
“mumble” rap exemplifies why: These rap genres emphasize sonic 
atmosphere over intelligibility. We now focus less on what rappers say, 
and more on how they sound.32 
For example, Tyler the Creator, the 2020 Grammy award winner for 
Best Rap Album, has argued for a deeper interpretation of his own 
lyrics, lamenting that “most people just read the surface.”33 An age-old 
adage cautions against judging books by their covers, but what does it 
mean to look beyond the surface of a spoken word? It is unusual to 
think of spoken language as a mere vehicle for some alternative or 
hidden meaning, or, in some cases, a lack of meaning. 
Although this paper will not attempt define what art is, it accounts 
for how the label of “art” affects First Amendment analysis: 
Categorizing speech as “art” (1) makes it potentially non-literal and (2) 
renders it culturally significant, and thus worthy of First Amendment 
protection.34 After Joseph Frederick unveiled his “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” banner at a 2002 Olympic Torch relay, the Court deemed it 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See, e.g., Kathy Iandoli, The Rise of ‘Mumble Rap’: Did Lyricism Take a Hit in 2016?, 
BILLBOARD (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/hip-hop/7625631/rise-
of-mumble-rap-lyricism-2016 (describing the mystique of rap where lyrics are nearly 
incomprehensible to the lay listener). 
 33.  Tyler, the Creator Reveals Range of Anti-Homophobia Merchandise, NME (May 8, 
2015), http://www.nme.com/news/tyler-the-creator—3/85233 (quoting Tyler the Creator as 
saying, “I’m legit one of the least homophobic guys to walk this earth but most people just read 
the surface”). 
 34.  See Post, supra note 6, at 1256 (Post constructs his own graphical table of how 
communication medium and First Amendment interests intersect). 
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nonsense of the mundane kind.35 But if he had directly quoted Lewis 
Carroll’s work, for example, nonsensical as it is, perhaps the same 
banner would have then been interpreted as art, and thus protected by 
the First Amendment. 
Although Lewis Carroll’s stories have been read against opium 
culture,36 he never argued for drug use in public schools or made direct 
threats of violence in his works. Indeed, the contained universe of most 
any fictional literary work makes it difficult for a novel’s narrative 
depiction of violence to feel like a genuine threat to a living person. 
This prosaic fact informs our collective sense of why “it [was] hard to 
imagine art speech constituting incitement, threats or fighting words.”37 
In “Rap on Trial,” the foundational 2014 paper on the use of rap 
lyrics in American courts, Professors Charis Kubrin and Erik Nielson 
recorded the notable example of an amateur attempt at rap being 
charged as a threat.38  The authors also cited to how professional rapper 
Lil Boosie’s (now Boosie Badazz) lyrics were entered in evidence for a 
separate murder charge.39  Still, there is an essential distinction between 
a published rap lyric being used as evidence of motive or confession 
and a rap song being criminalized as a threat in itself. The First 
Amendment is only relevant to the latter issue of art threats. I don’t 
know of any cases in which a published rap lyric by a professional 
rapper has itself been criminalized as a threat. 
III.  THE ART WORLD AS GATEKEEPER 
Our First Amendment regime developed in a market of scarce 
public speech. There has historically been a limited supply of 
newspapers and broadcasting outlets, and courts broadly deferred to 
news publishers’ judgments as to whether a news bit was relevant or 
significant.40 These threshold choices about “newsworthiness” (i.e., 
 
 35.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402 (2007). 
 36.  Is Alice in Wonderland Really About Drugs?, BBC (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.bbc. 
com/ news/magazine-19254839. 
 37.  Eberle, supra note 15, at 25. 
 38.  Charis E. Kubrin & Erik Nielson, Rap on Trial, 4 RACE & JUST. 185, 193–94 (2014) 
(discussing “the case against Olutosin Oduwole, a Black student at Southern Illinois University, 
whose rap lyrics alone were viewed as such a danger to the public that he was charged with 
attempting to make a terrorist threat” which “was so unsettling in its blatant criminalization of 
rap lyrics that it independently drew the attention of both authors and became the catalyst for 
their subsequent collaboration in this article”). 
 39.  Id. at 186. 
 40.  Kadri & Klonick, supra note 21, at 54 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
496–97 (1975) in which the Court emphasized that “the reliance must rest upon the judgment of 
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what counts as news) determined who qualified as a “public figure” in 
defamation suits.41  This analysis is obviously complicated in our new 
internet world of Twitter and Facebook. 
Similar, courts relied on the Art World to manage the boundaries 
of “art speech.”  Prior to the internet, gallery owners, museum curators, 
record label execs, literary agents, Hollywood producers and film 
festival committees exercised broad control in deciding which artists 
were seen or heard. With the internet, these barriers to entry have 
eroded. Now the novice or the untalented can upload their attempts at 
art directly to the internet for unlimited, and perhaps permanent, 
distribution. The internet has democratized access to distribution 
channels for talented artists who otherwise lack the resources or 
connections to break through to a commercial market. This is a very 
good thing. 
On the other hand, threshold determinations of artfulness made by 
Art World gatekeepers once directly informed whether a given work 
or expressive act may be scrutinized as a threat.  This quality control 
work is no longer done. The Supreme Court has avoided the issue of 
art threats, as seen most recently in the denial of certiorari in Knox v. 
Pennsylvania.42  But the problem of how to distinguish artful “good” 
rap from non-rap still lurks.43  Are courts avoiding this problem because 
they do not recognize it as a proper constitutional question, or because 
they recognize that other social institutions are better positioned to 
manage this culture-inflected issue? This is a profound question 
considering the prior quasi-legal work done by Art World gatekeepers. 
When the Art World made these sorts of threshold judgments, it 
effectively determined which speech or expressive acts were covered 
by the First Amendment. If the Art World validates a contested speech 
act as aesthetic, then it cannot be seen as threatening. Conversely, a 
speech act that is cognizable as a personalized threat cannot 




those who decide what to publish or broadcast.”). 
 41.  Id. at 42–51 (describing how defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress substantiate tort claims rooted in the First Amendment). 
 42.  139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 43.  See generally Andrew J. Kerr, Aesthetic Play and Bad Intent, 103 MINN. L. REV: 
HEADNOTES 83 (2018) (detailing various problems with making judicial inferences from rap 
lyrics, including discerning intent of lyrics, what constitutes “art” and what is non-performative, 
etc.). 
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this distinction is binary.  Either there is violent intent behind what you 
say, or there is aesthetic intent, but there cannot be both.44 
Doctrinally, a true threat is not even regarded as a speech act for 
First Amendment purposes, which is why violent intent and aesthetic 
intent are mutually exclusive. A true threat puts the listener in danger 
of life and limb, and thus it is not protected speech. Rather, the threat 
isn’t really speech in the First Amendment sense of the word at all. It’s 
criminalized as the verbal manifestation of a violent physical threat. 
The complication with this binary regime is that it ignores the 
reality that many speech acts have blended intent. A rapper—like many 
artists—might first be inspired to write a song out of emotions like 
anger or rage. Many artists might harbor bad intent at some point in 
their creative process. But professional artists are also socialized to an 
Art World in which audiences expect a piece to stand on its own, to be 
a thing unto itself. This generic posture is not very difficult to achieve 
for a visual artist. When art doesn’t use words, it’s hard for any single 
audience member to assume a violence-tinged piece is aimed at them—
for example, the recent gun-centric installations of celebrated sculptor 
Michael Murphy.45 
Musicians of course use words as part of the aesthetic materials that 
contribute to the construction of their songs. I acknowledge that many 
musicians want their words to convey meaning. Even so, it is rare for 
song lyrics to be heard as a personalized threat to a unique audience 
member. The singer-songwriter tradition relies on the anonymized 
“you” (or perhaps a substitute name like Layla46) when describing  a 
real muse. The identity of a past lover is made opaque and general by 
substituting a pronoun for that person’s name. Any of us could be this 
“you” if we wish to be, but none of us must be this “you” (or have to 
admit to being the “you”)47 if the lyricist derides the song’s object. The 
 
 44.  See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment 
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (2006) (describing the “threat exception” as statements 
that do not express intent to inflict harm); see also Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the 
First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 593 (2000) (“The standard for 
regulating threats should reflect this underlying assumption that true threats are something other 
than constitutionally protected speech, and the converse assumption that expression containing 
threatening language that is predominantly intended to communicate ideas or viewpoints is 
constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 45.  E.g., Alice Yoo, 130 Suspended Toy Guns Form a Map of the USA, MYMODERNMET 
(Oct. 1, 2014), https://mymodernmet.com/michael-murphy-gun-country/. 
 46.  The Real ‘Layla’ Talks About George Harrison and Eric Clapton, ABC NEWS (Dec. 20, 
2007), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/SummerConcert/story?id=3546199&page=1. 
 47.  Cf. Elyse Dupre, Alanis Morissette Addresses Rumors “You Oughta Know” Is About Ex 
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de-contextualization of the typical song lyric gives it a universal aspect 
that facilitates connection with and among listeners. 
However, much of contemporary rap comes from a storytelling 
tradition in which the rapper interweaves narrative description with 
structural moves like repetition or outro commentary.48 This narrative 
might rely on elements of an artist’s personal and collective 
experiences, and it occasionally might include graphic description of 
the rapper’s fantasies. Notable instances of the seemingly literal rap 
threat are heard in popular songs like Tupac Shakur’s “Hit ‘Em Up”49 
(disclaiming that “this ain’t no freestyle battle”50 prior to lyrically 
attacking Biggie Smalls and other rivals) as well as Eminem’s repeated 
violent references to his ex-wife Kim Mathers in peak-career albums 
like The Slim Shady LP and The Marshall Mathers LP.51 This kind of 
violence-tinged storytelling is not exclusive to rap: Bob Dylan appeared 
to fantasize about the death of General McNamara in “Masters of 
War.”52 
Still, Tupac, Eminem, and Bob Dylan are each considered front-
rank in their respective genres. Threshold quality control decisions to 
produce and distribute their music inform the law’s treatment of their 
potentially threatening lyrics. These are “easy cases” to the extent that 
they are disposed of prior to litigation. But what if we were not able to 
delegate this work of scrutinizing aesthetic intent to institutional 
gatekeepers?53 Here the Art World was effectively tasked with a true 
threats analysis to determine whether the aesthetic value of these 
Tupac or Eminem tracks outweighed the potentially threatening nature 
 
Dave Coulier, EONLINE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.eonline.com/news/1100258/alanis-
morissette-addresses-rumors-you-oughta-know-is-about-ex-dave-coulier (describing the subject 
of Alanis Morisette’s “You Oughta Know”). 
 48.  The outro of Kendrick Lamar’s song “m.A.A.d. city” provides an excellent example, in 
which the listener can hear a conversation between two men. SEE KENDRICK LAMAR, M.A.A.D. 
CITY (Interscope Records 2012). 
 49.  Stereo Williams, Tupac’s ‘Hit ‘Em Up’: The Most Savage Diss Track Ever Turns 20, THE 
DAILY BEAST (July 12, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/tupacs-hit-em-up-the-most-savage-
diss-track-ever-turns-20. 
 50.  Hit ‘Em Up (2Pac), GENIUS.COM, https://genius.com/2pac-hit-em-up-lyrics (last visited 
February 20, 2021). 
 51.  E.g., Kim (song), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_(song) (last visited 
February 20, 2021). 
 52.  See Tom Robbins, Robert S. McNamara: Master of War, THE VILLAGE VOICE (July 7, 
2009), https://www.villagevoice.com/2009/07/07/robert-s-mcnamara-master-of-war/ (noting that 
“Bob Dylan urged [people] to stand over McNamara’s grave . . . .”). 
 53.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (explaining 
that exploring “easy cases” in the law tell us something about the harder cases, and what make 
them hard). 
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of their lyrics. This is a nexus of the Watts factors of context, content 
and audience reception. The Art World can rightly think of itself as the 
intended audience for a rap. It also possesses the expertise to make 
evaluative decisions about content. And once the Art World has made 
this threshold quality control decision as to artfulness, legal actors can 
defer to the context of an economic market for these albums54 and trust 
that a minimum level of aesthetic intent went into their creation. We 
acknowledge that there is blended aesthetic/bad intent in the 
construction of some songs that enter our musical canon. Courts rely 
on the evaluations of market actors both (1) to dispose of these fact-
laden analyses and (2) to maintain the conceptual integrity of a 
freedom of speech doctrine that is forced to distinguish art from threat. 
IV. WHAT COUNTS AS A RAP? 
I do not attempt to resolve the perennial philosophical debate 
surrounding aesthetic intent in this paper.55 The creative process 
necessarily involves some degree of serendipity. Artists themselves 
might not be able to discern the motivations behind their own artwork 
or song lyric. Rappers rely on a kind of muscle memory that allows 
them to riff on tropes in the corpus and layer the internal meaning of 
their songs. They are acculturated to the “language game” of rap, in 
which they both internalize the conventions of the genre, and also press 
on these same rules and boundaries to distinguish their own flow and 
lend an element of improvisation and surprise.56  They search for the 
novel gesture that feels effortless. You don’t win the #rapgame by trying 
too hard, or by telling the listener that you are a real rapper and rapping 
a rap about what you will do to the listener. That will not fly today – it 
is an amateur attempt to play the game by including some overt 
signposts to a dated form of the genre. 
The problem for the law and rap community is that, generally, the 
literality of rap lyrics is inversely related to the quality of the song. It is 
 
 54.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (famously discerning 
commercial value as an index of artistic progress). 
 55.  Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 423 (2017) (“Answering 
that question by reference to the intentions of the work’s creator makes sense only if one adopts 
a substantive, and deeply contested, view about how intentions, meaning, and value interact in 
the context of art.”). Soucek generally refers to PAISLEY LIVINGSTON, ART AND INTENTION: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (2005). 
 56.  See Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech, in FREE SPEECH BEYOND 
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116–18 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 
2017) (introducing the Wittgensteinian concept of a language game in the context of nonsense 
speech). 
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almost always the novice who chooses to rap with such specificity that 
his lyric could be perceived as a personalized threat. The best rappers 
(at least since Tupac and Eminem) simply do not rap like this much 
anymore. Kendrick Lamar’s Good Kid M.A.A.D. City (2012) is a 
remarkable album that creates a cinematic experience for the listener. 
Its violent references are retrospective and internal to the narrative 
logic of the album.  It does not speak directly to a present listener. Most 
popular rappers aim to create an atmosphere or make critical 
commentary rather than to make individualized statements about a 
particular listener. Insular references appeal to fewer people, and thus 
engage only a limited audience. Real rappers perform for a generalized 
audience. 
The relationship between quality and literality frames the recent 
line of cases submitted to the Supreme Court (Elonis, Bell, Knox). In 
each of these cases the posted or rapped lyric is so specific in its object 
that it could threaten an intended audience member.  It is also unclear 
whether these attempted raps meet the threshold evaluative standard 
of rap-as-art. 
A.  Elonis v. United States: Do Elonis’s posts count as “raps”? 
Elonis v. United States was the first rap threat case reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.57 In this case, Anthony Elonis had uploaded to his 
Facebook page lyrics that made direct reference to actual events in his 
personal life and described violent acts toward his soon-to-be ex-wife 
and a federal investigator.58 For example, after a state judge granted 
Elonis’s wife a three-year restraining order, Elonis wrote, “Fold up your 
[protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket/ Is it thick 
enough to stop a bullet?”59 After a female FBI agent visited his home, 
Elonis wrote 
You know your s***’s ridiculous 
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b**** ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat 
 
 57.  Pierce, infra note 95, at 52. 
 58.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005–06 (2015). 
 59.  Id. at 2006. 
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Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner.60 
These shared posts were only written (Elonis had never actually 
recorded the rap) and their coarse directness makes them feel like 
Elonis’ violent intentions were literal. Their lack of artfulness explains 
why we receive them as threatening. 
The Third Circuit noted that Elonis had little personal history of 
rapping.61 Chief Justice Roberts also questioned the aesthetic value of 
Elonis’s raps.62 Roberts employed the interesting use of quotation 
when referring to Elonis’s Facebook posts, observing that after Elonis’ 
wife left him he began “posting self-styled ‘rap’ lyrics.”63 It is unclear 
whether Roberts is merely quoting from the record or if he is 
expressing skepticism about whether Elonis’s lyrics merit the aesthetic 
label of “rap.” But even if Elonis’s words feel crude and boorish, they 
are also inflected with tropes common to rap and parody music.  Elonis 
even assumes an alternative moniker “Tone Dougie” and disclaims that 
his lyrics are “fictitious” and bear no “intentional resemblance to real 
persons.”64 His posts include meta-commentary on the nature of his 
posting: “Me thinks the Judge needs an education/ on true threat 
jurisprudence.”65 He tells his readership that, although his lyrics are 
publicly shared, they are “[F]or me. My writing is therapeutic.”66 This is 
certainly a plausible reading, and it is true that many people over-share 
personal thoughts on the internet. 
Chief Justice Roberts avoided the precise question of whether these 
posts were sufficiently artful to be recognized as raps. Instead, the 
Court read a scienter requirement into the true threats analysis and 
held that because of Elonis’s direct references to the fictitious and 
cathartic nature of these raps, he did not possess the necessary mens rea 
to make a true threat with these posts.67 We can read this avoidance of 
a discussion on artfulness as reflecting a broader concern about the 
conceptual integrity of the true threats doctrine. If Roberts described 
the lyrics as art or actual raps, we might question his judgment. If 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Ms. Elonis further testified 
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during 
their seven years of marriage.”). 
 62.  See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004 (calling Elonis’s post “self-styled ‘rap’ lyrics). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 2005. 
 65.  Id. at 2006. 
 66.  Id. at 2005. 
 67.  Id. at 2012. 
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Roberts derided them as non-art, it would be difficult for him to tell 
Elonis’ ex-wife or investigating agent that they should interpret his 
statements non-literally. 
In dissent, however, Justice Alito dismissed the cathartic value of a 
potentially threatening post. He also questioned if the aesthetic 
intention of a posted lyric necessarily shields it from true threats 
analysis, worrying that this rule “would grant a license to anyone who 
is clever enough to dress up a real threat in the guise of rap lyrics, a 
parody, or something similar.”68 
V. ART AS COVER? OR COVERING ART? 
Implicit in Justice Alito’s analysis is the concern that a bad-
intentioned speaker can simply declare her own speech as “art” and 
receive First Amendment coverage. That by pretextually checking off 
certain signifiers of rap, an ill-intentioned speaker can self-create the 
magic legal status of “art speech” and shield her actually threatening 
speech from a true threats analysis. There is a dangerous alchemy here. 
A private actor can marshal the force of the law simply by inserting 
some slangy language or making familiar references. This conflicts with 
our core constitutional principle that we cannot “permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself” by empowering him to determine that 
his own speech act receives special constitutional protection.69 It just 
cannot be this easy to avoid criminal sanctions when the harm remains 
the same. 
This echoes the argument about barriers to entry and the gestalt 
nature of contemporary art. We share an expectation of the time and 
effort that goes into a novel, the instrumentation that goes into a rock 
album, or the vocal refinement that makes a song R&B. But rap (along 
with performance art and pop art) relies on a gestalt sense of quality 
that is internal to those in the community. Critics and record label 
executives decide what counts as rap and who does it well.  It might not 
matter much if I scribble a Campbell’s Soup can and declare it “art,” 
because it is no threat to safety. But if I parrot the cadence and word 
usage of a popular rap song in a threatening diatribe, I can potentially 
be covered by the First Amendment and thus endowed with certain 
positive entitlements against the state and other individuals. Rap music 
is not easy to fake, but rap lyrics might be. 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878). 
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The literal interpretation of “speech” as including only spoken 
language feels under-inclusive. We assume that text, or written work, is 
covered, too. The Supreme Court has also expanded “speech” to refer 
to other sorts of speech-like or expressive kinds of conduct.  Notably, 
in Citizens United v. FEC, we were reminded that corporations speak 
through their spending.70 We also speak when we wear a black armband 
in school,71 when we tape a peace sign to an American flag,72 when we 
make decisions about who may or may not march in a parade,73 and 
even when we design a wedding cake (but, importantly, only if it is a 
beautiful wedding cake).74  What is the doctrinal boundary for this kind 
of expressive conduct? The First Amendment cannot cover all of the 
ways we express ourselves. Jed Rubenfeld hypothesized how breaking 
the speed limit could be a profound form of expression for the sports 
car-loving libertarian.75 Still, a judge would certainly toss out a First 
Amendment defense to a speeding ticket as frivolous. 
Discerning the boundaries of the First Amendment requires 
identifying the usual constitutional two-step framework for deciding 
whether a government action comports with the Constitution.76 First, 
we look to the Constitution to check off if a certain kind of action is 
covered by its text (e.g., if a particular class of government 
investigations counts as a “search” or “seizure” per the Fourth 
Amendment, such as rifling through your glove compartment). Only 
then do we ask whether a specific search is protected, given our 
standards of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
This threshold question is commonly ignored in First Amendment 
analysis, in part because of the vagueness issue identified above. 
 
 70.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346–47 (2010) (holding that, under the First 
Amendment, funding of political broadcasts cannot be limited based on the corporate identity of 
the speaker). 
 71.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (holding 
that wearing of armbands to communicate a certain view is “akin to ‘pure speech’” and is entitled 
to First Amendment protection). 
 72.  See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406–07 (1974) (holding a Washington state law 
that prohibited appellant from displaying an American flag affixed with a black peace symbol 
impermissibly infringed on appellant’s First Amendment right to expression). 
 73.  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(holding, under the First Amendment, the state may not compel private citizens organizing a 
public demonstration to include groups with a message antithetical to the organizer’s message). 
 74.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018) 
(“The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful 
wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.”). 
 75.  Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 772–75. 
 76.  Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. 
L. REV. 267–82 (introducing the coverage question). 
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“Seizure” is fairly precise word77; “speech” is not. It is so difficult to 
chart the boundaries of constitutional speech that most would rather 
assume coverage than define where the exact boundaries of speech 
coverage are. 
In part, this reflects our assumptions about the institutional context 
of public communication, and how formal vetting channels like 
publishers or curators used to make threshold decisions about aesthetic 
quality. We could fairly ignore the coverage question concerning “art 
speech” because the Art World already managed it. The coverage 
question was outsourced. 
The law and rap community is certainly not unique in conflating 
coverage questions about art speech with normative questions about 
courtroom use of rap lyrics. Scholars have produced important 
academic research on the overuse of rap in courtroom litigation. 
Professors Andrea Dennis and Erik Nielson’s recent Rap on Trial is a 
comprehensive look at the unwise, and sometimes unscrupulous, ways 
that prosecutors have entered drafted lyrics or recorded rap songs as 
courtroom evidence: as a confession of having committed a crime, or as 
demonstrating a motive to commit a crime.78 There are two problems 
here. First, rap should only rarely be used in court, considering its weak 
probative value. Second, if it is going to be used, we shouldn’t be under-
inclusive. Singling out rap as a criminalized musical genre has obvious 
racial implications given the strong associations between rap and Black 
culture. 
The use of rap as evidence is an important socio-legal problem, but 
it is not a First Amendment problem. In short, the First Amendment 
does not cover evidence law—as legal doctrines, they exist in separate 
spheres.79 The First Amendment does not insulate either non-literal or 
artful speech from courtroom use. Privilege exceptions are made in 
evidence law for things like doctor-patient or spousal communication 
because we value trust and candor in these specified relationships. But 
First Amendment values are mostly irrelevant to evidence law. If I write 
and publish a song about killing a man in Reno “just to watch him die,” 
 
 77.  Schauer, supra note 12, at 1772–73 (explaining the coverage question in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment is determined by the scope of the “comparatively clear” word “seizure”). 
 78.  Erik Nielson & Andrea L. Dennis, Rap on Trial, BOS. REV. (Nov. 8, 2019), 
http://bostonreview.net/arts-society/erik-nielson-andrea-l-dennis-rap-trial. 
 79.  Schauer, supra note 12, at 1783–84 (“Less visibly still, much the same degree of First 
Amendment irrelevance holds true for the content-based regulation of . . . virtually the entirety of 
the law of evidence . . . and that vast domain of criminal law that deals with conspiracy and criminal 
solicitation.”) (emphasis added). 
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and then a corpse is discovered near my hotel during my documented 
stay there, then my lyric can surely be entered as evidence to my motive 
or as a confession.80 It doesn’t matter if my song is rollicking or 
penetrating or chart-topping. Its Art World status is independent to its 
status as potential courtroom evidence. Of course, my own defense 
attorneys would contest the lyric’s probative value by suggesting it is 
pure fiction that merely reflects my broader oeuvre as a singer-
songwriter. A jury could then weigh these competing considerations as 
to the sincerity of my song and its status as a genuine confession. We 
don’t like having to specify with nicety if or how much art represents 
reality, and so we delegate this difficult, perhaps un-articulable, decision 
to the factfinder. 
What the law and rap communities seem to confuse here is how the 
First Amendment treats art speech in a true threats analysis as 
compared to in the evidentiary context. The Johnny Cash song “Folsom 
Prison Blues” is surely covered as art speech by the First Amendment. 
It is validated by the Art World and has been received by fans and 
critics as a wonderful example of song craft. Ex ante, we allow this 
speech act to be part of our public sphere because it does not strike fear 
in any particular listener. The reference to a Reno murder is internal to 
the song’s narrative logic. Ex post, we might discover that this lyric was 
confessional of an actual killing. But it retains its First Amendment 
coverage even if it is later marshaled as evidence. This speech act does 
not target anyone today. 
Doctrinally these are separate issues. True threats doctrine presents 
the First Amendment problem of whether a potentially threatening 
speech act can be vocalized at all. It frames whether the speech act may 
be part of the public sphere, or if it can instead be criminalized. The 
non-literal nature of attempted rap lyrics is generally sufficient to put 
prosecutors or judges on notice of the weak probative value of rap as 
evidence. But a song or rap must also be good for the First Amendment 




 80.  But see the amicus brief submitted by ACLU of New Jersey in Skinner v. New Jersey 
Dept. of Corrections, 2016 WL 3063727, at *3 (2013) (suggesting that Johnny Cash’s “Folsom 
Prison Blues” should not even be admitted as evidence of motive and intent), https://www.aclu-
nj.org/cases/state-v-skinner. 
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VI. RAP IN POLITICAL AND AESTHETIC CONTEXT 
The most recent rap case petitioned for Supreme Court review, 
Knox v. Pennsylvania, can be unpacked as both a political speech case 
and as an art speech case. Before analyzing the precise lyrical issue 
prompted in Knox, I first contextualize this case within the framing 
moves made by the law and rap community in the form of repeat 
amicus briefs. In each of Elonis, Bell, and Knox the law and rap 
community submitted amicus briefs in support of the aspiring rapper 
facing a true threats prosecution or school suspension.81 Despite some 
stylistic distinctions in these briefs, they make broadly similar 
arguments. The main points are echoed by amicus submissions from kin 
advocacy groups and art scholars in these cases. 
In general, these briefs illuminate a cultural history of rap that 
informs a non-literal interpretation of rap lyrics. They examine ‘70s and 
‘80s street culture, as well as the contemporary political and social 
unrest, which, taken together, gave rise to rap as a music genre.  Each 
refers to examples of important songs from the rap corpus in which the 
artist uses violence for aesthetic effect or to sublimate their own 
aggression. The briefs identify general characteristics common across 
the genre of rap music, including typical lyrical moves made by rappers, 
to demonstrate how these genre expectations provide a model or 
template for the aspiring rapper. The argument is that influential artists 
have rapped in often seemingly violent or threatening ways, and as an 
aesthetic community, we have interpreted them non-literally. So, when 
aspiring rappers make the same lyrical moves, we should interpret 
these amateur attempts the same way: non-literally. These would-be 
rappers are simply participating in an aesthetic discourse. 
These briefs are essential for two reasons: (1) They situate an 
unfamiliar reader/listener like a judge for this particular kind of speech 
act, and (2) they suggest the political nature of rap.  There is value in 
detailing this kind of unspoken context for rap music. Rappers 
participate in a language game with an internal set of rules that are 
known to fans and critics. An individual rapper can assume that if 
 
 81.  See Brief for Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 2–3, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); see also Brief for 
Erik Nielson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3–4, Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd, 
799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); see also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Michael Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson, and Other Artists and Scholars in Support of 
Petitioner at 2–3, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox 
v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
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someone purchases their album or streams their song, listeners are 
already acculturated to the conventions of the genre and will interpret 
the lyrical moves against this implied context. However, when a rap is 
heard—or worse, read—by a court unfamiliar with this background 
context, then the individual judge is unable to construct legible 
meaning of a contested lyric. These amicus briefs provide the Supreme 
Court with a sort of playbook—familiarizing judges, who largely came 
of age before the advent and mainstreaming of rap in America, with the 
genre’s familiar patterns. 
These amicus briefs also play a critical role in explaining how rap 
often bleeds into political speech. In doing so, they expand our 
collective conception of what political speech encompasses and thus, 
what speech is protected by the First Amendment. Political speech is 
core to the First Amendment. We protect it because vibrant dissent is 
necessary to democratic self-government and our education as 
citizens.82 Political speech can take many shapes. Quintessentially, it’s 
the flyer of the pamphleteer, the speech of the soapbox contrarian or 
an op-ed in your local newspaper. But what these amicus briefs 
emphasize is that rap is founded on political subtext—a common 
example is rap’s critique of police. Rap, much like your typical political 
speech, functions as a First Amendment “safety valve,” allowing 
rappers to vent anti-authority aggression and to lament systemic racism 
and police brutality. We can hear rap, even rap made of violent, 
inchoate lyrics, about “the system” and law enforcement to be a 
covered form of political speech. For example, NWA and Ice-T have 
been valorized by the Art World. But even if they had self-published 
their anti-police raps83 their message could be conceptualized as 
political speech. In short, without the historical context, a judge might 
not be able to identify or understand a rap’s subtextual political 
message. 
But there are two core doctrinal problems with the arguments 
advanced by the law and rap community. First, the early demographic 
history of rap does not map squarely onto who produces or consumes 
rap music today. Statistical disciplines like criminology show the odious 
 
 82.  Schauer, supra note 12, at 1785 n.104 (identifying important political speech theories 
“based on self-government or democratic deliberation”). 
 83.  E.g., Fuck tha Police, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuck_tha_Police (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2021) (“a protest song by American hip hop group N.W.A.”); Cop Killer (song), 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cop_Killer_(song) (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (Ice-T 
collaboration with metal band Body Count). 
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racial patterns at work in who ends up in jail after drafting rap lyrics. 
But a threats analysis works at the individual level to discern one’s 
intent. If any American, regardless of race or class, is allowed to dress 
up a true threat by parroting a rap lyric, allowing them to do so obscures 
the relevant historical genealogy of rap and distorts criminal law 
doctrine. For example, Anthony Elonis was a white man without a 
history of writing, let alone vocalizing, raps.84 Do we need to situate his 
Facebook post within a cultural tradition of protest rap? We can assume 
that the amicus briefers were worried about the background subtext of 
a generation of young black men who are too eager to share their 
amateur raps on the internet, and thus argue for a kind of blanket 
coverage that protects sympathetic black voices as well. But this 
individual-group conflation points to the tensions in operationalizing a 
normative socio-legal critique and encourages the amici to ignore the 
problem of artfulness. 
The second doctrinal problem is that these briefs make assumptions 
about aesthetic quality based on genre conventions. They cite to a few 
important rap songs that have included potentially threatening lyrics as 
evidence of a genre-wide convention, and then situate Elonis’s lyrics 
about his wife, Bell’s lyrics about his gym teachers, or Knox’s lyrics 
name-checking his arresting officers as merely following that genre 
convention.  The mistaken logic is that “if those prior raps are violent, 
and these contested lyrics are also violent, then these contested lyrics 
must be raps as well.” But this reasoning largely ignores the important 
gatekeeper function of the Art World: It forgets that these cited rap 
songs were already vetted as artful before they became popular or 
influential. The amici’s point conflates prior raps’ descriptive use of 
violence and their constitutionality as proxy for all raps’ 
constitutionality. But it is important to distinguish those raps, which had 
been validated by the Art World and were thus received by listeners as 
both non-literal and aesthetic even though their raps happened to 
detail violence, from the unartful attempted raps at issue in Elonis, Bell, 
and Knox. Artfulness is the constitutional linchpin: It is why we cover 
(and the only reason why we are able to cover) the apolitical, 
potentially threatening raps of Eminem and Tupac. 
 
 84.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Ms. Elonis further testified 
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during 
their seven years of marriage.”). 
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VII.  ONE CASE, TWO WAYS 
A. Was Jamal Knox doing political speech? 
Jamal Knox was arrested as part of a routine traffic stop that 
escalated when he and a co-defendant fled the vehicle on foot.85 He was 
apprehended, and police discovered fifteen bags of heroin on his 
person along with a wad of cash.86 He was charged for a number of 
crimes, including providing a false name and possessing a stolen gun.87 
While his case was pending, Knox and his co-defendant wrote and 
recorded a rap song titled “Fuck the Police.”88 Knox’s lyrics vivify his 
animosity toward the local Pittsburgh police unit. Most of the lyrics are 
rote puffery and flexing typical of gangster rap. But Knox also adds a 
granular level of detail in his first verse that makes his amateur rap 
uniquely threatening: He “refer[s] to Officer Kosko and Detective 
Zeltner by name” and insults them in language too graphic for the text 
of this paper.89 In doing so, the rap is transformed into a particularized 
threat to these two law enforcement officers, triggering a true threats 
analysis. 
The specificity of this reference negates its generic value as anti-
police political speech.  It is a distortion of the concept of political 
speech to claim that it includes name-dropping private individuals. The 
rap scholars’ brief observes without citation that “rap music and other 
forms of political protest do indeed single out people by name.”90  It is 
certainly true that rap lyrics, like those of many musical genres, have 
referred explicitly to elected politicians, well-known bureaucrats, and 
other popular artists.91 But when a lyricist makes direct reference to a 
public official, we interpret the reference to be mere fantasy or 
reflective of a broader ideological critique because of the nonliteral 
nature of rap as art. A recent well-known example of this kind of 
political namedrop is “FDT” (2016) by rappers YG and Nipsey Hussle. 
“FDT” is short for “Fuck Donald Trump,” and was written in response 
 
 85.  Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148 (Pa. 2018). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 1149. 
 88.  Id. Not to be confused with “Fuck Tha Police” by iconic rap group N.W.A., supra note 
83. 
 89.  Id. at 1149–50. 
 90.  Brief of Amici Curiae Michael Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson, and Other Artists 
and Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 17, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), 
cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 91.  See, e.g., EMINEM, ‘TILL I COLLAPSE (Interscope Records 2001) (rapping about his 
“beef” with Nas, JAY-Z, and a number of other popular artists). 
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to Trump’s divisive 2016 presidential campaign.92 The celebrity of 
Donald Trump gives the song a popular appeal that made the rap a 
topical political anthem. It is a critique of Trump’s persona and 
campaign message—not a literal description of what these rappers 
want to happen to Trump in real life. This public/private distinction is 
consistent with how we think about reputation more generally in the 
law. For example, private persons need to prove mere negligence in a 
defamation suit because private individuals are unable to marshal the 
resources to defend themselves against a defamatory statement.93 
Likewise, we interpret raps about famous people non-literally in part 
because as public officials, they attract public attention. We assume 
from there that public critique is a normal consequence of placing 
yourself in the public discourse. 
In Knox, both Officer Kosko and Detective Zeltner are employees 
of the state. They each wear a police badge, the chevron of authority. 
But when Officer Kosko is not in uniform, he’s a private citizen. On the 
other hand, elected public officials are always on the job. It is less clear 
whether regular state employees, even those who work in law 
enforcement, always personify the state. If an individual police officer 
is already well-known because of alleged wrongdoing, then she is a 
viable target for political speech. But threatening an otherwise 
unknown law enforcement officer offers no public appeal and instead 
personalizes a song, so that the officer reasonably feels in danger of her 
own safety. Whereas referring generically to a “cop who arrested me” 
would universalize the experience and imbue the lyric with political 
gravity. 
B.  Was Jamal Knox doing aesthetic speech? 
A similarly difficult question is whether Knox’s rap qualifies as art 
under the First Amendment. Kleinman interpreted Hurley to mean that 
the first Amendment only covers “great art.”94 We should not read 
Hurley’s references to Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock to suggest 
that only art that is the standard of our cultural canon is covered by the 
First Amendment. Rather, the Court was simply citing well-known 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Weingarten, YG Talks Summer Protest Anthem ‘FDT (F—k 
Donald Trump)’, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
features/yg-talks-summer-protest-anthem-fdt-f-k-donald-trump-249942/. 
 93.  See Michael Pierce, Prosecuting Online Threats After Elonis, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 
1003 (2016) (arguing courts should apply a hybrid approach that “focus[es] on the identity of the 
target and impose[s] a higher mens rea standard when the target is a public figure”). 
 94.  Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010). 
KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  6:50 PM 
2021] THE FIRST AMENDMENT & RAP AS ART 199 
examples of seemingly “meaningless” art to illustrate a doctrinal 
point—that art does not have to convey a particularized meaning 
qualify as art. Furthermore, institutional gatekeepers have long 
distinguished art from non-art, but certainly there has been art of 
variable quality published or curated since time immemorial. This 
paper does not propose a neat standard for the threshold art vs. non-
art distinction under First Amendment doctrine. Rather, my proposed 
working test is that for a rap to become “art speech” it must be 
cognizable as rap-as-art. Essential to evaluating if a rap is artful is how 
it impacts a listener. 
Any honest reviewer would remark that “Fuck the Police” by Knox 
and Beasley is much better than its transcribed lyrics alone would 
indicate. This supports the observation that lyrical quality is generally 
a weak index of the overall listenability of a rap song. Knox and Beasley 
are each competent rappers—they can flow in the pocket and vary their 
delivery in response to beat shifts. The most interesting bar is when 
Knox states: “My momma told me not to put this on CD/ but I’m gonna 
make this fuckin’ city believe me.”95  This seems to echo the same meta-
awareness observed in Elonis’s references to the risky nature of 
distributing threatening lyrics and his disclaimers about the veracity of 
his own lyrics. We can plausibly interpret this line to suggest a similar 
kind of aesthetic awareness on the part of Knox and to reinforce the 
rap’s non-literal intent. This might read too much into the meaning of 
Knox’s lyrics. But this fourth wall reflection on how audiences might 
receive his lyrics goes to the constructedness of the song and suggests 
that he aims to rap for a generalized audience. 
Knox is a tough case. This is in large part because the First 
Amendment paradigm requires distinguishing aesthetic intent from a 
subjective intent to threaten—under blackletter doctrine, a speech act 
cannot have blended intent. A threat is conceptualized as a kind of 
physical action, which allows us to make a content-based value 
judgment and thus disfavor the speech. This creates strange outcomes 
such as where a rap could pass First Amendment muster if it was 
minimally artful yet extremely threatening.96 If a rap meets the 
 
 95.  Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1150 (Pa. 2018). 
 96.  Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 202 (2012) 
(suggesting the need for a balancing test); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 17, at 829 (noting the 
converse to this problem, “[a]s far as Brandenburg is concerned, a person who deliberately incites 
others to commit a minor offense is in the same position as a person who incites others to riot. In 
both cases, the speech is equally unprotected.”). 
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threshold standard of artfulness, then we are simply indifferent to the 
intensity or directness of the threat. It is already in the covered zone of 
art speech. We can put an “explicit” label on its album cover and 
prevent it from being played on the radio or at schools. But it cannot 
be criminalized once it is deemed art speech. 
Of course, this is not the calculus that was used prior to modern 
First Amendment doctrine,97 nor is it the kind of decision-making 
process that has ever been used by the Art World. Rather, we can 
assume that institutional gatekeepers employed a sort of balancing test 
that considered both the aesthetic value of the song and how a 
potentially threatening line might sound. The more reputable an artist 
is the more likely a record label A&R or a record producer would 
publish the potentially threatening line.98 And presumably, a competent 
record producer would likely suggest editing a line like the one in 
“Fuck the Police” that individuated local police officers. 
Other approaches to unpacking criminal and aesthetic intent have 
been proposed. Justice Alito in his Elonis dissent offered a recklessness 
test for art threats in which the speaker or artist acknowledges how an 
audience is likely to receive a posted or recorded lyric.99 This audience-
awareness approach would require the artist to consider the medium of 
expression and her expected audience. In other words, would-be 
rappers should recognize how posting lyrics on the internet may distort 
a post from its original context or intended meaning.100 The 
permanence of internet communication reifies the “present-ness” of a 
communicative act, extending the lingering sense of threat that a reader 
might feel.101 At the same time, an artist can claim that sharing a rap 
publicly on the internet demonstrates that she expects a generalized 
audience of listeners.102 
Alito’s test is novel because it contemplates that aesthetic and bad 
intent might co-exist.  Indeed, Alito himself might not realize how this 
 
 97.  See, e.g., Lakier, supra note 18, at 2179–82 (explaining the difference between First 
Amendment jurisprudence in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the Court’s approach to 
freedom of speech and expression in the twentieth century). 
 98.  For example, Tupac’s references to east coast rap foes in “Hit ‘Em Up” or Eminem’s 
repeat references to his ex-wife in his early oeuvre. 
 99.  Elonis v. United States 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014–16 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 100.  P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in 
Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 50 (2015). 
 101.  John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected 
Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 633 (2016). 
 102.  Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1145, 1166–67 (2013). 
KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  6:50 PM 
2021] THE FIRST AMENDMENT & RAP AS ART 201 
synthetic understanding of intent may destabilize the very core of the 
First Amendment regime. It also seems to require that judges perform 
a quality control role, previously assigned to the Art World, and forces 
the artist to consider both her likely audience and whether a listener 
will reasonably assume that a rap is targeting them as an individual. The 
problem with this audience-aware approach is that it favors the known 
over the unknown artist.103 There is a real fear that a recklessness 
standard might chill the kind of provocative art speech that we want to 
encourage in our First Amendment culture. For example, an unknown 
artist might be discouraged from taking creative risks, thereby 
perpetuating her status as an unknown artist. Still, the Alito test is an 
important innovation because it reminds us of the real reason that we 
cover art speech—not because it contributes to our marketplace of 
ideas, vitalizes our political discourse, or empowers speaker autonomy, 
but because there is a qualitative aesthetic value internal to First 
Amendment culture.104 
VIII.  WHY WE COVER ART 
A.  A Marketplace of Art Speech 
It is necessary to understand the legal moorings of art speech before 
considering possible ways to cover and secure it in our post-gatekeeper 
world. Justifying protection on a Holmesian marketplace of ideas 
principle has little merit. That is because the First Amendment largely 
does not care about the idea represented in a given artwork, or if it 
represents one at all. There are two theories of aesthetic experience: 
mentalists, who focus on how the mind receives an artwork in context, 
and sensualists, who consider how people experience pleasure through 
art.105 Each is consistent with the fact that an artwork does not have to 
convey an effable idea to nevertheless be artful. This is also true of rap, 
especially in the new paradigm of a rap world where sound is 
prioritized over meaning. For example, I have listened to 
“EARFQUAKE,” the standout single from Tyler the Creator’s 2020 
Grammy-winning rap album IGOR, innumerable times over the last 
year, but I still have no clue what rapper Playboi Carti is even saying 
 
 103.  Kerr, supra note 43, at 90. 
 104.  Tushnet, supra note 96, at 173 (suggesting that we assume nonrepresentational art is 
covered “because we think that such art is, in some sense, a ‘good thing’”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Peter Brooks, An erotics of art, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1975), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/09/14/archives/an-erotics-of-art-the-pleasure-of-the-text-sz.html. 
KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  6:50 PM 
202 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 16 
on his signature guest verse.106 It’s clearly awesome. It’s also 
unintelligible to the casual listener. For the reader’s convenience, here 
are some of the song’s lyrics107: 
We ain’t gotta ball, D. Rose, huh 
I don’t give a fuck ‘bout none’, huh 
Beamin’ like fuck my lungs, huh 
Just might call my lawyer, huh 
Plug gon’ set me up, huh (Yeah) 
Bih’, don’t set me up (Okay) 
I’m with Tyler, yuh (Slime) 
He ride like the car, huh 
And she wicked, huh, yuh 
Like Woah Vicky, huh, yeah (Like Woah Vicky) 
Oh, my God, hold up, um 
Diamonds not Tiffany, huh, yeah (Woah, woah) 
So in love 
So in love 
It is still not wholly obvious to me what Playboi Carti is rapping 
about, but I am confident that having completed this rap-reading 
exercise will have a negligible impact on my future enjoyment of 
listening to this song. The reason I like it is because of its sonic impact. 
The marketplace of ideas is irrelevant here, because no coherent idea 
is communicated. 
B.  Art speech as political speech 
Other theorists have argued that art speech is covered by the First 
Amendment because exposure to art elevates our political sensibility. 
These post hoc moves to cover art speech confuse the benefits of an 
arts education with the precise First Amendment question of why or 
how we determine that certain artworks are covered. Marci Hamilton 
suggested in her article, “Art Speech,” that aesthetic expression is a 
kind of pre-verbal or non-discursive form of political expression.108 
 
 106.  See Earfquake, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earfquake (last visited Feb. 
20, 2021) (noting that the song features a guest appearance of “American rapper Palyboi Carti”). 
 107.  EARFQUAKE, GENIUS.COM, https://genius.com/Tyler-the-creator-earfquake-lyrics 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2021). 
 108.  Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 103–09 (1996). 
KERR_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  6:50 PM 
2021] THE FIRST AMENDMENT & RAP AS ART 203 
Others have viewed the arts as inspiring anti-government criticism or 
imagination that are fundamental to self-government.109 Even 
Alexander Meiklejohn, who is recognized as advocating for limiting 
First Amendment protections to political speech, argued that 
“literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment … 
[because] they lead the way toward sensitive and informed application 
and response to the values out of which the riches of the general 
welfare are created.”110 These connections feel tenuous because of the 
breadth and generality of the argument.111 Many human activities “lead 
the way” to an appreciation of constitutional values; for example 
running a small business, or even ticket scalping might inspire reflection 
on First Amendment values.112 A political speech rationale lacks 
explanatory power here. 
C.  Art speech as autonomy 
The marketplace of ideas and political speech theories of why the 
First Amendment covers art each have an instrumental orientation: to 
improve the quality and range of our ideas, or to rarefy our political 
sensibility. The other theory that has been proposed by scholars is the 
deontological value of speaker autonomy.113 This theory posits that the 
First Amendment incorporates an expansive notion of speech because 
speech is important in itself, expression nurtures inchoate thoughts, and 
speech helps us explore the frontiers of our imagination and develops 
our sense of self.114  This kind of identity value converges with Justice 
Kennedy’s thinking about personal destiny and vision of self.115 But this 
 
 109.  See id. at 76 (“Art permits individuals to experience alternative worlds, thereby 
providing an efficient and effective means of testing the status quo without risk.”); see also Patricia 
Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1580–81 (1984) (noting that 
some art has “emotive” content that is “not devoid of political content” and may “undermine the 
assumption of systemic order and stability”). 
 110.  Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
257. 
 111.  See Blocher, supra note 56, at 131 (observing that Meiklejohn’s argument “may be a bit 
of stretch”). 
 112.  Tushnet, supra note 96, at 173. 
 113.  See generally T. M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 
97 VA. L. REV. 541 (2011); see also Eberle, supra note 15, at 19 (arguing for art coverage based 
on theories of self-realization). 
 114.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) 
(describing free speech as a vehicle for self-realization). 
 115.  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“Roe recognized the right of a woman 
to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the 
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person.”). 
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autonomy value alone does not explain what distinguishes art speech 
from the Jed Rubenfeld example of the sports car-loving libertarian 
who feels the urge to express herself by breaking the speed limit.116 An 
autonomy rationale could be marshaled to justify any and all of the 
many quotidian or anti-social things said or done each day. It simply 
covers too much.117 
D.  Art speech as culturally important speech 
The best explanation of why art speech is covered by the First 
Amendment, or why any sort of speech is covered by the First 
Amendment, is because it is core to our First Amendment culture.118 
Professor Schauer encouraged us to 
consider the possibility that the most logical explanation of the 
actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come less from an 
underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the 
political, sociological, cultural, historical, psychological, and 
economic milieu in which the First Amendment exists and out of 
which it has developed.119 
Dean Post echoes this same culture-based intuition, writing that the 
boundaries of the First Amendment are “anthropologically 
apparent.”120 The First Amendment covers things that we like (good 
art), and it covers things that we usually do not like (crude political 
speech, ignorant speech), but we tolerate it because we want to serve 
other cultural goals like having a vibrant democracy or protecting the 
free trade of ideas.121 
 
 
 116.  This is a widely shared critique. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 44, at 12 n.38 (citing Robert 
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971)) 
(“[T]he important point is that these [autonomy] benefits do not distinguish speech from any 
other human activity.”); see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment 
Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 772 (1986) (noting that theories of “self-expression” are 
insufficient because “they do not distinguish speaking from a wide range of other self-expressive 
activities that fall outside the purview of the first amendment”). 
 117.  See Scanlon, supra note 113, at 546 (“The chief problem with ‘autonomy’ is that it is 
commonly understood in too many different ways.”). 
 118.  See Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 228 (2009) (referring to Professor Adler’s own scholarly project as a “cultural 
theory of the First Amendment”). 
 119.  Schauer, supra note 12, at 1787. 
 120.  Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 617, 623 (2011). 
 121.  In terms of Bobbitt’s modalities, the former reason is ethical, the latter reasons are 
prudential. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Methods of Constitutional Argument, 23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 453, 457 (1989) (describing prudential and ethical arguments). 
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Tautological as it may be, we like good art because we like good art. 
But the quality control work of prior institutional gatekeepers gave 
content to this notion of “good art.” Without these gatekeepers, the law 
community is forced to define the general principles that delimit First 
Amendment coverage. 
Take, for example, Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky.” Joseph 
Blocher’s recent contribution on nonsense speech is an erudite look at 
defining and valuing the use of nonsense in society, and elegantly 
situates Justice Souter’s reference to “Jabberwocky” in Hurley.122 I first 
explicate a threshold issue that is both obvious yet essential: 
“Jabberwocky” was not shared by an unknown author on an internet 
forum. Rather, it was written by the celebrated author Lewis Carroll, 
and included as part of his novel, Through the Looking-Glass, and What 
Alice Found There, the sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.123 
This background context primes the reader to recognize it as literary 
writing.  It has already met the threshold standards of the Art World 
(here, the world of literary publication), and it is read against this 
implicit quality control work. Lewis Carroll was himself a lecturer at 
Oxford. Certainly, this credential adds an aura of reputation and quality 
surrounding his work. Finally, Jabberwocky is not simply nonsense. It is 
lyrical and full of whimsy, and reading Jabberwocky is a pleasurable 
aesthetic experience. It is really good nonsense.124 
In short, the First Amendment covers good art. But the coverage 
question remains largely unarticulated because it depends on 
naturalized perceptions about art that are part of our “social milieu.”125 
Prior to the internet, courts and legal officials deferred to institutional 
gatekeepers and the consumer art market for determinations of art 
speech. We can critique the normative legitimacy of such a regime. 
Certainly, record executives and other Art World players might be 
more motivated by profit than elevating public taste. But this is a 
descriptive account of how the prior First Amendment regime worked. 
Now amateur artists—like amateur rappers—can disseminate their 
attempts at art to an internet audience, thereby circumventing the 
 
 122.  See generally Blocher, supra note 56. 
 123.  LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
19–20 (1872). 
 124.  Perhaps the context of it being a novel is irrelevant to its aesthetic value. See Susan 
Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through Pseudocommunication, 
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (2008) (“In the context of Lewis Carroll’s children’s story, 
Jabberwocky has no meaning, at least that an adult audience could discern.” (emphasis added)). 
 125.  Schauer, supra note 12, at 1787. 
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traditional role of the “gatekeeper.” 
The problem for internet rappers is that some of these potential 
audiences might not “get it” or have a desire to learn how to appreciate 
rap. Therefore, I argue (1) for a civic response to the gatekeeper 
problem by institutionalizing a rap guild or (2) to re-imagine the state’s 
role in doing quality control work that used to be done by record labels. 
IX. PROPOSALS 
A.  A rap guild 
My first proposal is that rappers create a sort of self-regulated guild 
based on internal standards of quality to recreate the work once done 
by institutional gatekeepers. This move would add a layer of 
institutional credibility for unsigned rappers or rappers who choose to 
self-release their music and make membership based on community 
standards of aesthetics rather than relying on the marketing calculi of 
record label execs.126 A rap guild would not manage individual rapper’s 
choices as to what or when to release music to the internet, and so its 
“quality control” work would be limited to membership decisions. This 
is consistent with the evolutionary nature of rap. The social definition 
of rap seems to be whatever the aesthetic output is of people who look 
or act like rappers.127  This lack of a rigid sonic template for rap is 
liberatory and exciting in some ways and informs recent aesthetic 
moves like the sing-songy trap of Young Thug and Travis Scott, or emo-
rap of Lil Peep and Juice WRLD. But this rapper-inflected definition of 
rap is also problematic. When genre-hopping musicians like Drake128 or 
Tyler the Creator129 aim to expand their catalog and produce non-rap  
 
 
 126.  Cf. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 508 (2001) (observing how 
certain cultural groups have First Amendment expression protections because of constructed 
notions of insularity and group membership). 
 127.  Cf. Schauer, supra note 19, at 1275 (“[W]e investigate whether that value is situated 
significantly within and thus disproportionately served by some existing social institution whose 
identity and boundaries are at least moderately identifiable. If so, then we might develop a kind 
of second-order test. If there is a reporter’s privilege, for example, we might ask not whether this 
exercise of the privilege serves primary First Amendment purposes, but instead simply whether 
the person claiming the privilege is a reporter.”). 
 128.  Joey Nolfi, Drake Disputes His Grammy Category: ‘Hotline Bling’ is ‘Not a Rap Song’, 
ENT. WKLY (Feb. 19, 2017), https://ew.com/grammys/2017/02/19/drake-grammys-hotline-bling-
not-rap-song/. 
 129.  Toyin Owoseje, Tyler, The Creator Slams Grammys’ ‘Urban’ Category as a Politically 
Correct Version of the N-word, CNN (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/27/ 
entertainment/tyler-the-creator-grammys-intl-scli/index.html. 
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songs, the music industry still categorizes these R&B or pop songs as 
“rap.” 
There are also core critiques about the viability or ethos of such a 
guild.  It admittedly would be quite difficult to administer a guild made 
up of likely hundreds of thousands of wannabe rappers.  The Screen 
Actors Guild (SAG) provides a helpful analogy. Perhaps the threshold 
institutional setting of a Hollywood film explains in part why we never 
see criminal cases related to statutory rape or contributing to child 
delinquency. In a way, the Hollywood depictions of these crimes still 
satisfy their strict liability nature. It would be similarly surprising to see 
an actor’s film work cited as evidence in a courtroom. Because the SAG 
does the ex-ante work of declaring who is an “actor” (analogous to a 
rapper in the context of this proposal), we assume work performed by 
guild members is a professional attempt at “art” and thus has zero legal 
relevance. Another way to frame this is that the Art World, or SAG, is 
making the kinds of quasi-legal decisions I referred to earlier about 
aesthetic quality through its selection of members that we as social 
actors rely on and defer to. These “easy cases” are never thought to be 
litigated.  But perhaps a scene depicting statutory rape in a low-budget 
homemade indie film would be received differently by a court. Another 
example is a stand-up comedian making a statement that would be 
considered defamatory when being interviewed on the nightly news but 
would be dismissed as a “joke” if recited on stage as part of a bit. The 
institutional context distinguishes these seemingly congruent acted 
scenes or lies/jokes. But hard cases still present themselves, such as a 
comedian on a news-inflected talk show130 or naturalistic forms of 
performance art.131 The problem is that the provocative artist might be 
intentionally trying to blur and complicate contextual boundaries. 
Indeed, that might be the very point of the artwork or performance. As 
a result, art threats is “a very non-legal area of law” that is perhaps best 
managed outside of courts.132 
I sense that the law and rap community is trying to make a similar 
argument that all rap should be assumed to have zero legal relevance, 
 
 130.  See, e.g., Joseph Ax, Trump Withdraws “Orangutan” Lawsuit Against Comic Bill Maher, 
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/entertainment-us-usa-trump-
lawsuit/trump-withdraws-orangutan-lawsuit-against-comic-bill-maher-
idUSBRE9310PL20130402 (revealing that Donald Trump withdrew his lawsuit against Bill 
Maher for calling Trump the son of an orangutan). 
 131.  See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 11, at 184–85 (2012) (noting that performance art that 
would include defacing public property should violate the First Amendment). 
 132.  Kerr, supra note 43, at 102. 
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for either threats analysis or probative value in evidence. To this extent 
the creation of a rap guild similar to the Screen Actors Guild could help 
them achieve these desired ends. But the SAG is also a labor union, and 
this professional distinction allows it to control membership based on 
pay stubs or other gatekeeper determinations of quality. My rap guild 
proposal is specifically non-economic in nature, which complicates 
membership evaluation. 
Finally, we might wonder if a rap guild conflicts with the very ethos 
of rap.  Rap is commonly thought of as a transgressive genre. Perhaps 
an institutional organization is at odds with an anarchic, rebellious 
ethos that still manifests in many kinds of rap today. I am certainly open 
to other novel forms of gatekeeping that maintain the integrity of this 
ever-evolving genre. I am also unsure if today’s rappers are necessarily 
anarchic, or at least any more anarchic than any other genre of 
musicians. Some of our most famous rappers are known for their 
organizing abilities and entrepreneurial talent. 
B.  The State as Quality Control Worker? 
My second proposal is that the state enters the quality control space 
that used to be managed by record labels or other gatekeepers like 
book editors or film producers. At first blush, this might feel strange. 
After all, political speech is core to freedom of speech jurisprudence, 
and we typically interpret this to mean dissent. There seems to be an 
obvious conflict of interest in allowing the state to do the work of 
editing anti-state speech; it is the literal definition of censorship. 
My proposal is limited to the production and distribution of art 
speech. As I have argued, the jurisprudential basis for art speech is not 
that it contributes to the marketplace of ideas or vitalizes democratic 
self-government, but our shared sense that the First Amendment 
should cover quality aesthetic expression for values internal to our 
constitutional culture. There might not be any blackletter doctrine for 
this. But nor are there any recorded cases of published rap or art being 
deemed a true threat by a court. The only distinction between a song 
like Tupac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Jamal Knox’s “Fuck the Police” is that 
Tupac is considered a great rapper. In just the last half-decade, three 
amateur rap threat cases have petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari. A fourth is inevitable. 
The jurisprudential basis for art speech is the seeming tautology 
that we like good art.  It is not that controversial to think the 
government should help people improve the quality of their art. Every 
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day, governments make aesthetic decisions on which kind of art to fund, 
or to curate in museums.133 Still, as rappers use words as part of the 
construction of their songs, it is understandable why it might feel icky 
if a government employee is influencing which words are vocalized in 
a rap. This might faintly echo the problem of coercive thought in 
Barnette v. West Virginia.134 
I counter that this might depend on our rhetoric about the state, 
and how we understand the precise job description of the quality 
control worker. If the state is depicted as an Orwellian surveillance 
regime, which has a monopoly on the use of violence, then this might 
feel scary. But if we equate the state with a licensed social worker or 
public-school guidance counselor, then maybe readers can be more 
sanguine about this kind of quality control work. Amateur rappers or 
performance artists do not benefit from the professional editing work 
of record label or publishing house. A school counselor who is able to 
explain to students why name-checking a private individual is received 
differently than rapping about an institution or “the system” is not 
necessarily distorting the identity of a student’s rap song, but she might 
help this student avoid school suspension or a court visit.135 This 
growing-pain concern is an important one in the context of rap threats, 
where a subtext for cases like Elonis is the very many young people 
who are simply writing their way through their early development as a 
rapper. Likely, most of these potential art speech cases are already 
managed by institutions like schools. We have in-person social spaces 
that allow for managing and editing the misfires of the young artist so 
that she can develop a sensibility of what is aesthetic, yet provocative. 
The internet is less good at this. 
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in a case involving a novice rapper who posted to 
Facebook and YouTube a recording of a rap he wrote about allegations 
concerning the lewd behavior of two gym coaches at his Mississippi 
high school.136 Like the aesthetic output of most teenagers, Taylor Bell’s 
 
 133.  Soucek, supra note 55, at 384–85. 
 134.  See Enrique Armijo, The Freedom of Non-Speech, 33 CONST. COMMENT 291, 314–16 
(2018) (contextualizing art speech within theories of First Amendment protection to not use 
words, associated with scholars like Louis Michael Seidman and Martin Redish). 
 135.  Interestingly, YG was visited by Secret Service after he released a music video and was 
pressured to omit a line for the published album version that made reference to cartel kingpin El 
Chapo. Adelle Platon, YG Says Secret Service Reached Out Following Release of Anti-Trump 
Song, May Try to Take His Album Off Shelves, BILLBOARD (Apr. 27, 2016), https:// 
www.billboard.com/articles/columns/hip-hop/7348438/yg-secret-service-donald-trump-fdt. 
 136.  Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert denied 136 S. Ct. 1166, 
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lyrics lacked sophistication and tact. But they also inflected some 
topical rap devices (e.g., “Run up on T-Bizzle” echoes the lexicon of 
Snoop Dogg) and rhymed.137 It was a clear attempt at rap, even if not a 
very good one. It also mentioned inserting “a pistol down [one of the 
coach’s] mouth” and referred to these coaches and the school by 
name.138 Bell was suspended for seven days and had to spend the rest 
of the grading period (approximately six weeks) at the county 
alternative school.139  An en banc Fifth Circuit panel upheld the school 
board’s decision.140 
This case is further complicated by the fact that school 
administrators must balance individual rights of self-expression with 
the exigencies of moral education and discipline.141 But this same 
mandate for moral education could re-frame how school personnel 
managed Taylor Bell’s case. A seven-day suspension, six weeks at the 
county alternative school and not being allowed to attend school 
functions feels like quite a draconian sentence for an attempted rap. 
Perhaps instead a counselor could have worked with Bell to edit or 
remove these lyrics after his internet posts were discovered by school 
administration. The First Amendment acts as a sort of social safety 
valve.142  We should allow individuals to vocalize anti-social or violent 
thoughts so they do not manifest as violent action. This safety valve 
function informs the history of “battle rapping,” in which live 
participants in a freestyle “cypher” traded barbs and insults in rhyme 
form. 
But the problem today is that an amateur rapper might think they 
are merely performing something like a “battle rap” when the internet 
listener (e.g., Bell’s gym coach) is unaware of this genre context. A 
battle rap that is not rapped in-person in direct view of the audience, 
but that is instead posted to an unmediated internet is likely received 
quite differently. In Wittgensteinian terms, Bell was using rap-like 
language for an audience who was not part of the relevant rap language 
 
1166 (2016). 
 137.  Bell, 799 F.3d at 384. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 385. 
 140.  Id. at 389. 
 141.  See id. at 389–90 (noting that a student’s First Amendment rights must be “tempered” 
in light of the specific functions of school and education). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (noting that a student “may express his opinions . . . if 
he does so without materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others”). 
 142.  THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). 
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game. It is an example of cultural discord that seems resolvable outside 
of an institutional setting. We should consider non-legalist143 responses 
to what are social problems prompted by our evolving internet speech 
culture. 
CONCLUSION 
Rap is art. However, that does not mean that all who attempt to rap 
are necessarily artists or record artful songs. This is axiomatic of all 
musical genres and all forms of art. The word “art” is commonly 
assumed to connote a threshold of quality. We apply this word only to 
paintings, or songs, or performances that are good. And so, although my 
paper clarifies that the First Amendment does not necessarily cover the 
written or recorded raps of amateur rappers, it also reminds the legal 
world that not all rap speech is equal. This is a good thing as well. 
The law and rap community seems to want to insulate attempts at 
rap from both courtroom use and threats analysis. But while their 
motivations are sympathetic, their logic functions to deny the nobility 
of rap as compared to other music genres. There is a legitimation cost 
to declaring that all attempted raps are covered by the First 
Amendment, that bad rap, or even Justice Alito’s feigned rap, is equal 
to good rap.144 This reinforces a societal perspective that rap is simple, 
unrefined, rote or juvenile.145 That it’s a kind of folk tradition rather 
than an aesthetic form of music. 
This kind of popular, or folk, approach to rap is reflected in perhaps 
the most formative contribution to law and rap scholarship, Paul 
Butler’s “Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment.”146 
Butler’s groundbreaking paper cites to rap as a form of cultural 
authority, as an index of community views about different theories of 
criminal jurisprudence.  His paper reflects a novel way to approach  
issues of community justice and can be situated within his wider 
intellectual project on jury nullification.147 
 
 143.  See generally JUDITH N. SKLAR, LEGALISM (1964) (describing why legalism as theory 
does not appropriately balance morality and politics). 
 144.  Cf. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1405–12 (2009) (discussing the “legitimation costs” of the creation of 
a constitutional right to abortion). 
 145.  Cf. Anthony Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 311, 312–13 
(1999) (positing that poetry has aristocratic inclinations). 
 146.  Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
983 (2004). 
 147.  See generally Paul Butler, Racially-Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
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But to the extent his paper is a theory of folk jurisprudence, and 
how ideas about criminal justice percolate through a community of 
rappers and rap audiences, then his theory is necessarily more about 
ideas than about the aesthetic quality of rap. Ideas were likely much 
more important to early genres of rap, like the political rap of Public 
Enemy in the 1980s or the conscious rap of the 1990s associated 
individuals like Mos Def and Common. Today ideas don’t matter as 
much in rap. However, if we build a theory of rap based in its idealized 
vision of justice, this leads the law and rap community to think about 
the demographics of rappers and the other societal problems they face. 
This all sounds good in theory. But it also causes us to forget the 
fundamental qualitative determinations that go into the production 
and distribution of rap as an art. This aesthetic basis of rap justifies its 
constitutional coverage as art speech. Prior to the internet we didn’t 
need to think about these aesthetic thresholds because published rap 
had necessarily been vetted (and likely edited) in the quality control 
work of our gatekeepers.  But now that the amateur rapper, or the 
feigned rapper, can simply upload their seemingly threatening rap to 
the internet, we need to rethink fundamental coverage questions. These 
are broad principles, and they seem to reduce to facile metrics like 
likeability and quality.148 This makes the coverage boundaries feel a bit 
non-legal and perhaps beyond judicial ken. But maybe this is a reason 
why we should finesse these boundaries and allow new sorts of 
intervention to help with the quality control work that the old 
gatekeepers no longer do, so that we can help young artists learn the 
recognized boundaries of their artform outside of the court system. 
 
 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (arguing for the increased consideration of race by black 
jurors in criminal cases involving black defendants). 
 148.  Cf. Post, supra note 6, at 1272 (“The most general statement of this point is that all legal 
values are rooted in the experiences associated with local and specific kinds of social practices.”). 
